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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Howard Dean Jones appeals from his conviction after trial for attempted
strangulation.
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
Jones was charged with aggravated assault and attempted strangulation after a
domestic incident involving himself, his girlfriend, and his girlfriend’s coworker. (R., pp.
44-46.)
At trial, Jones’s girlfriend, Melissa Umbaugh, testified that she returned home
from work late one night with Lisa Kuba. (Tr. vol. I, p. 129, L. 25 – p. 130, L. 15; p. 133,
L. 23 – p. 134, L. 10. 1) Umbaugh testified that Jones was already home, and that he and
Umbaugh got into a dispute about her possibly moving to Pennsylvania, which led to
Jones attacking Umbaugh. (Tr. vol. I, p. 134, L. 11 – p. 135, L. 7.) Umbaugh testified
that Jones choked her multiple times. (Tr. vol. I, p. 135, L. 20 – p. 136, L. 4; p. 138, L.
19 – p. 139, L. 19; p. 141, L. 14 – p. 142, L. 23.)
Kuba witnessed the attack and ran out of the house to call 911—she testified that
as she did so, Jones pushed her out of the house, and she “rolled [her] foot,” breaking it.
(Tr. vol. I, p. 170, L. 5 – p. 171, L. 12.) Eventually, Jones pushed Umbaugh outside of
the house as well. (Tr. vol. I, p. 142, Ls. 20-23.)
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This brief denotes the 255-page volume containing transcripts from the first day of trial
and the sentencing hearing as “Tr. vol. I” and the 172-page volume containing transcripts
from the second day of trial as “Tr. vol. II.”
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Officers arrived on the scene to find Jones alone in the locked house, with a couch
barricading the living room door. (Tr. vol. I, p. 208, L. 19 – p. 212, L. 17.) One officer
on the scene took pictures of Umbaugh’s injuries; her ear was bloody, and her neck was
red where Umbaugh testified Jones had choked her. (See
- - State’s Ex. 2; Tr. vol. I, p. 143,
L. 19 – p. 144, L. 4; p. 145, L. 19 – p. 146, L. 11; p. 219, L. 20 – p. 220, L. 2.)
Jones testified at trial. (Tr. vol. II, pp. 18-88.) The defense’s theory of the case
was to admit that Jones battered Umbaugh, but to deny he choked her. (Tr. vol. II, p.
130, L. 7 – p. 131, L. 6.) Thus, Jones freely admitted on cross-examination that he
“tr[ied] to shake the truth out of” Umbaugh, but he also testified that he would never put
his hands on a woman’s neck, and specifically denied ever placing his hands on
Umbaugh’s neck. (Tr. vol. II, p. 37, Ls. 11-24; p. 54, L. 12 – p. 55, L. 19.)
However, prior to the trial, Jones had admitted to his mother in a jail phone call
that “I realized I had my hands around [Umbaugh’s] neck, then I turned her loose.”
(State’s Ex. 6, 3:11 – 03:15.) The state impeached Jones’s testimony by playing an audio
recording of this call. (Tr. vol. II, p. 83, L. 12 – p. 85, L. 2.) On redirect, Jones changed
his testimony, now stating that he did touch Umbaugh’s neck, but only did so
accidentally. (Tr. vol. II, p. 85, L. 10 – p. 88, L. 1.) He also testified that he did not
mention it during direct examination because he misremembered it. (Tr. vol. II, p. 88, Ls.
2-18.) The state argued in closing that Jones was not credible, and characterized the gap
in time from the initial testimony to the redirect testimony as defense counsel’s “chance
to try to fix” things, to which Jones had no objection. (Tr. vol. II, p. 111, L. 8 – p. 112,
L. 16.)
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The jury acquitted Jones of aggravated battery but found him guilty of attempted
strangulation. (R., p. 141.) The district court sentenced Jones to ten years imprisonment
with three years fixed. (R., p. 147.) Jones timely appealed from the judgment of
conviction. (R., pp. 145-54.)
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ISSUE
Jones states the issue on appeal as:
Did the prosecutor commit misconduct by insinuating, in his closing
argument, that Mr. Jones and his attorney were fabricating a defense and
committing/suborning perjury, and, if so, did this misconduct constitute
fundamental error requiring reversal of Mr. Jones’ conviction?
(Appellant’s brief, p. 4)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Jones failed to show it was fundamental error for the prosecutor to comment
on Jones’s contradictory and unbelievable testimony?
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ARGUMENT
Jones Has Failed To Show It Was Misconduct, Much Less Fundamental Error, For The
Prosecutor To Comment On Jones’s Contradictory And Unbelievable Testimony
A.

Introduction
Jones argues, for the first time on appeal, that the state’s remarks about his

contradictory testimony, and his attorney’s “chance to try to fix” that testimony,
constituted “egregious and inflammatory” prosecutorial misconduct that was fundamental
error. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 5-13.)
But the prosecutor’s remarks were not misconduct, because closing arguments can
challenge a witness’s credibility based on evidence and evidence-based inferences. Here,
Jones’s testimony was not believable because it was called into question by his own
contradictory recorded statements and inconsistent testimony. Jones therefore fails to
show that the prosecutor’s comments were prosecutorial misconduct, much less that they
were fundamental error necessitating a reversal of his conviction.

B.

Standard Of Review
Absent a timely objection below, this Court will only review an alleged trial error

under the fundamental error doctrine. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 226, 245 P.3d 961,
978 (2010).

C.

Jones Gave Contradictory And Unbelievable Testimony About Whether He
Touched Umbaugh’s Neck; It Was Therefore Entirely Proper, And Neither
Misconduct Nor Fundamental Error, For The State To Comment On His
Credibility
For the first time on appeal, Jones claims the prosecutor committed misconduct

“by insinuating, in his closing argument, that Mr. Jones and his attorney were fabricating
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a defense and committing/suborning perjury.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 5 (capitalization
altered).) Because he did not preserve this issue with an objection below he is required to
show fundamental error on appeal. Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978. To
establish fundamental error,
the defendant bears the burden of persuading the appellate court that the
alleged error: (1) violates one or more of the defendant’s unwaived
constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists (without the need for any additional
information not contained in the appellate record, including information as
to whether the failure to object was a tactical decision); and (3) was not
harmless.
Id. at 228, 245 P.3d at 980. Because review of the record shows that the prosecutor’s
argument was wholly appropriate, Jones has failed to show error, much less fundamental
error entitling him to review of this unpreserved claim.
1.

Jones Fails To Show That Remarks On His Credibility Would Be A
Violation Of An Unwaived Constitutional Right

Parties have considerable latitude in closing argument and may fully discuss the
evidence and the inferences to be drawn from the evidence. State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho
267, 280, 77 P.3d 956, 969 (2003). The state may not, however, “make personal attacks
on defense counsel in closing argument.” Id. (finding a statement that defense counsel
“‘tried to hide the facts and to mislead’ the jury” would be improper, though not rising to
the level of fundamental error) (citing State v. Page, 135 Idaho 214, 223, 16 P.3d 890,
899 (2000); United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 9 (1985)).
Nevertheless, a prosecutor may express a personal belief as to the credibility of
witnesses—so long as the comment is based solely on inferences from evidence presented
at trial—because the parties have a “a right to express how, from each party’s perspective,
the evidence confirms or calls into doubt the credibility of particular witnesses.”
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Sheahan, 139 Idaho at 280, 77 P.3d at 969 (citing State v. Priest, 128 Idaho 6, 14, 909
P.2d 624, 632 (Ct. App. 1995)).
Here, Jones was charged with attempted strangulation of Umbaugh and
aggravated battery of Kuba, but not simple battery of Umbaugh.

(R. pp. 44-46.)

Accordingly, his trial strategy was to admit he battered Umbaugh, but to repeatedly and
specifically deny he choked her:
Q [from prosecutor]. You said you shook [Umbaugh] by the shoulders—
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Is that correct?
A. Yep.
Q. You never placed your hands on her neck, did you?
A. Nope. I sure didn’t. If I did, it was her shirt—her work shirt against her
neck—
Q. But you’d never—
A. –it wasn’t my hands. Nope.
Q. You would never put your hands on somebody’s neck, would you?
A. Nope. I sure haven’t.
Q. Certainly not right here?
A. Nope. If you think I did that, how was she able to call the laws?
Q. Mr. Jones, I get to ask the questions; okay?
A. If I was—
Q. Mr. Jones, please wait for a question; okay?
THE COURT: Wait. Wait. Wait. Let’s just take it a step at a time. Answer
the question as it’s asked.
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BY MR. WILLMORE:
Q. You would never hit a woman, correct?
A. Sure ain’t.
Q. You would never put your hands on a woman; is that correct?
A. Not on their neck, no.
Q. Not on their neck?
A. No.
(Tr. vol. II, p. 54, L. 12 – p. 55, L. 19 (emphasis added); ----see also p. 130, L. 7 – p. 131, L.
6.)
As it turned out, Jones had previously stated the exact opposite: he told his mother
in a recorded jailhouse phone call that “I realized I had my hands around her neck, then I
turned her loose.” (State’s Ex. 6, 3:11 – 03:15; Tr. vol. II, p. 84, L. 23 – p. 85, L. 2.)
After the state impeached Jones by playing this audio for the jury (Tr. vol. II, p. 84, Ls. 421), defense counsel asked about the discrepancy on redirect examination (Tr. vol. II, p.
85, L. 10 – p. 88, L.18). Jones now testified to something completely different: he
admitted that he did touch Umbaugh’s neck because his hands had been sweaty and “I
reckon my hands slipped,” but when he “realized my hand was on her neck,” he “turned
her loose immediately.”

(Tr. vol. II, p. 85, Ls. 10-25.)

To explain his disparate

testimony, Jones testified that “I have a hard time remembering, you know, certain
things.” (Tr. vol. II, p. 88, Ls. 4-14.)
Unsurprisingly, the state highlighted Jones’s contradictions and shifting
explanations of the incident in its closing argument:
And then the phone call. You remember that? You remember maybe a
little excitement in the courtroom? You guys had to leave for a little bit.
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And then you heard the call. We will play that in a minute. Where, “Oh,
yeah, I told my mom. I realized. It just dawned on me. My hands were
actually on her neck.”
And then Mr. Essma had his chance to try to fix that, after, of course, an
hour and a half break. We introduced the evidence. We break for an hour
and a half, what do you know? Mr. Essma states:
“So how come, Mr. Jones, when I first asked you about this
incident, you didn’t say anything about your hands being on the
victim’s neck?”
One, he is not giving you the whole story. And two, his answer does not
corroborate with anything that either of the other witnesses said.
“Oh, I reckon my hands were hot and sweaty from shaking the truth out of
her, and my thumbs just happened to go across her throat for a half second.
Didn’t mean to choke her. I didn’t think I chocked [sic] her. Not strong
enough to stop her breathing or yelling or anything like that. It was just a
mistake, and as soon as I realized it, I stopped.” Really?
That’s the story they gave you. Now they don’t have a burden, but he did
testify. And the state is more than welcome to attack his story. That is
what it is, a story.
(Tr. vol. II, p. 111, L. 8 – p. 112, L. 14.)
Jones cannot show the state’s remarks violated any unwaived constitutional rights,
because based on his contradictory testimony it was entirely appropriate for the state to
comment on his credibility. Jones repeatedly and unambiguously testified under oath that
he never put his hands on Umbaugh’s neck—right until the state played audio of him
admitting to placing his hands on Umbaugh’s neck. (Tr. vol. II, p. 54, L. 12 – p. 55, L.
19; p. 84, L. 23 – p. 85, L. 2; State’s Ex. 6, 3:11 – 03:15.) At this point, Jones
backpedaled and reversed course, admitting that he had put his hands on Umbaugh’s
neck, but only by accident. (Tr. vol. II, p. 85, Ls. 10-25.) The entire contradictory
sequence created an obvious, evidence-based inference: Jones was not credible and his
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testimony was not believable. Per Sheahan, the prosecutor’s remarks were completely
proper comments on credibility, based on the evidence, and Jones fails to meet the first
prong of Perry by failing to show the violation of a clear constitutional right. See
Sheahan, 139 Idaho at 280, 77 P.3d at 969.
Jones disagrees, arguing that “the prosecutor’s reference to an hour-and-a-half
break in the proceedings is critically important, as the break could not possibly have
presented the defense with an opportunity ‘to attempt to fix’ its case, as it came after the
defense had rested….” (Appellant’s brief, p. 11 (emphasis added).) Based on this timing
Jones claims the remark was therefore “factually inaccurate and completely misleading,”
and moreover “[t]here is absolutely no indication that defense counsel spent the break”—
meaning the lunch break—“trying to ‘fix’ any aspect of Mr. Jones’ case.” (Appellant’s
brief, p. 10.)
But Jones is misreading the state’s timeline. Jones assumes the “break” that the
prosecutor referred to was the lunch break after the defense rested. (Appellant’s brief, pp.
10-11.) A review of the record, however, shows that the state was referring to the break
in time between the introduction of the tape—at which point the jury was excused—and
Jones’s eventual discussion of the tape on redirect. (See R., p. 125 (showing the jury
being excused at 10:23, the prosecutor laying foundation for the audio at 10:25, and
redirect examination starting at 11:28)). In other words, the state was referring to the
temporal “break” between the introduction of the evidence and Jones’s opportunity to
address it.
The prosecutor’s closing argument shows this, as it clearly places the “break”
before defense counsel’s redirect questioning, and necessarily before the lunch break:
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And then the phone call. You remember that? You remember maybe a
little excitement in the courtroom? You guys had to leave for a little bit.
And then you heard the call. We will play that in a minute. Where, “Oh,
yeah, I told my mom. I realized. It just dawned on me. My hands were
actually on her neck.”
And then [defense counsel] Mr. Essma had his chance to try to fix that,
after, of course, an hour and a half break. We introduced the evidence. We
break for an hour and a half, what do you know? Mr. Essma states:
“So how come, Mr. Jones, when I first asked you about this incident,
you didn’t say anything about your hands being on the victim’s
neck?”
(Tr. vol. II, p. 111, Ls. 8-23 (emphasis added).) Likewise, the prosecutor’s sentencing
argument sets out the same timeframe, placing defense counsel’s chance to repair the
damaging testimony before Jones’s testimony on redirect:
And I said, “You wouldn’t tell people you’d put your hands on her throat,
then, would you?” And he said, “Yeah, I’d tell people I put my hands on
her throat, only if I did, though.” Then I said, “Have you ever told anybody
that, then?” And he said, no.
Then I held up a jail phone call and said, “Do you remember making a call
to your mom, telling her you put your hand on her throat?” And he went
really quiet, all sorts of objections, and we break for an hour and a half.
Ultimately the phone call comes in. Sure enough, clear as day, the
defendant admits to putting his hands on her throat. After him testifying
I’d never say that unless I did it.
And then after consulting with Mr. Essma, we come back in for trial, and
his testimony is now, “Oh, it slipped my mind. Yeah, at some point, while
shaking the truth out of her. It was really hot, and my hands must have
been sweaty because, sure enough, while shaking the truth out of her, my
hands slipped around her throat, and there they were. And then it dawned
on me suddenly that, ‘oh, my hands are on her throat. I need to back that
off and just continue shaking the truth out of her on her shoulders.’” How
incredulous [sic] is that story?
(Tr. vol. I, p. 245, L. 14 – p. 246, L. 21 (emphasis added).) Thus, correctly construed, the
state’s position was not that defense counsel and Jones “had the chance to try to fix” his
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testimony during the lunch break, after both sides had rested. Rather, the state was
arguing that Jones “had the chance to try to fix” his prior testimony by testifying on
redirect.
This was not misconduct for two reasons.

First, characterizing redirect

examination as a “chance to try to fix” testimonial blunders is not improper; it is simply a
description of one of the purposes of redirect. See,
e.g,
People v. Melendez, 55 N.Y.2d
- - ------------445, 451 (1982) (“For example, apparent inconsistencies or contradictions in a witness’
statements or acts brought out on cross-examination to discredit his testimony may be
reconciled on redirect by relating to the jury the relevant surrounding circumstances.”);
Ravenswood Const., LLC v. F.L. Merritt, Inc., 105 Conn. App. 7, 19 (2007) (“The basic
purpose of redirect examination is to enable a witness to explain and clarify relevant
matters in his testimony which have been weakened or obscured by his crossexamination....”).
And here, Jones’s testimony sorely needed clarification: he unambiguously
testified that he had never placed his hands on Umbaugh’s neck. (Tr. vol. II, p. 54, L. 12
– p. 55, L. 19.) The jury then heard a recording of Jones himself candidly admitting to his
mother that he placed his hands on Umbaugh’s neck. (State’s Ex. 6, 3:11 – 03:15; Tr.
vol. II, p. 84, L. 23 – p. 85, L. 2.) It is therefore no surprise that defense counsel would
take the opportunity on redirect to address the contradictory statements and reconcile or
clarify them; or in other words, “fix” them.
Jones assumes the worst when he interprets the “chance to try to fix” remark as an
accusation that his counsel suborned perjury. (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 10-12.) But the
state never accused defense counsel of suborning perjury or fabricating a defense. (See
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Tr. vol. II, pp. 108-28, 149-62); -see --also -----------State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 719, 215 P.3d
414, 439 (2009) (quoting Donnelly v. DeChristofro, 416 U.S. 637, 647 (1974)) (appellate
courts will not “‘lightly infer that a prosecutor intends an ambiguous remark to have its
most damaging meaning or that a jury, sitting through lengthy exhortation, will draw that
meaning from the plethora of less damaging interpretations.’”)
A gentler interpretation is that the state meant that defense counsel could “fix”
damaging testimony in the usual sense: by addressing it on redirect and eliciting, for
example, explanations that earlier statements were misremembered or mistaken. Indeed,
this would be the most reasonable interpretation, because this is exactly what Jones and
his counsel actually did:
Q [from defense counsel on redirect]. When I asked you before what you
did, why is it that you didn’t mention that then?
In other words, when I asked you before what happened, you said that you
were pushing her in this area, but you didn’t mention that your hands had
slipped to her neck. Why didn’t you mention that then?
A. I don’t know. It might have crossed my mind, you know, because I
have a hard time remembering, you know, certain things. It’s like you tell
me something, I’m going to have a hard time remembering because I
been—been beat in the head so many times, you know.
(Tr. vol. II, p. 88, Ls. 2-14 (emphasis added).) All told, considering the audio recording’s
damage to Jones’s testimony, the purposes of redirect, and defense counsel’s reparative
follow-up questions, Jones has failed to show it was even inaccurate—much less
improper—to characterize redirect as trial counsel’s “chance to try to fix” his deeply
damaged prior testimony.
Finally, even assuming that the “chance to try to fix” remark was purely a
comment on Jones’s truthfulness and credibility, he still fails to show any misconduct.
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The state is allowed to comment on evidence calling a witness’s credibility into doubt.
Sheahan, 139 Idaho at 280, 77 P.3d at 969.

Skeptical commentary was entirely

appropriate given Jones’s initial testimony that he never touched Umbaugh’s neck,
followed by a later reversal admitting that, actually, he had. Initial unconditional denials,
contradicted by a taped admission, followed by backpedaling qualified admissions, is
exactly the sort of unbelievable sequence that the state may permissibly comment on.
Even if the remark went purely to Jones’s credibility, it was accurate, and proper, and
nowhere near a violation of an unwaived constitutional right, for the state to call it what it
was.
2.

Even If Remarking On Jones’s Credibility Would Be A Violation Of An
Unwaived Constitutional Right, Jones Fails To Show Such An Error Is
Clear And Obvious

Alternatively, even assuming Jones can show a violation of an unwaived
constitutional right, he fails to meet Perry’s second prong, because he fails to show a
violation that is clear and obvious from the record. See Perry, 150 Idaho at 228, 245 P.3d
at 980.
First, Jones fails to show a clear and obvious violation because his argument is
predicated on “[t]he prosecutor’s reference to an hour-and-a-half break in the
proceedings,” a point he argues is “critically important” to his claim. (Appellant’s brief,
p. 11.) However, as shown above, Jones misconstrues what the state was referring to
when it made remarks about a “break”; the state contends, and the record affirms, that the
prosecutor was plainly not referring to the lunch break. Thus, Jones cannot show a clear
and obvious error, insofar as he fails to show that a “critically important” piece of his
claim even refers to what he thinks it does.
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Second, Jones fails to show a clear and obvious violation because there were
strategic reasons not to object to the state’s closing argument. Jones’s whole theory was
that while he may have battered Umbaugh, he did not touch her neck. (Tr. vol. II, p. 130,
L. 7 – p. 131, L. 6.) He repeatedly testified under oath that he never touched her neck.
(Tr. vol. II, p. 54, L. 12 – p. 55, L. 19.) This theory and testimony fell apart once the jury
heard an audio recording of Jones admitting to touching Umbaugh’s neck, and further
unraveled when Jones admitted the same on redirect. (State’s Ex. 6, 3:11 – 03:15; Tr.
vol. II, p. 84, L. 23 – p. 85, L. 25.) To the extent objecting to the state’s remarks would
call further attention to the contradictions, and further undermine Jones’s testimony,
credibility, and theory of the case, there were self-evident reasons not to object. All told,
even if there was a violation of an unwaived constitutional right, Jones fails to meet
Perry’s second prong because he fails to show that the error is clear and obvious from the
record.
3.

Even If Jones Has Shown A Clear And Obvious Violation Of An
Unwaived Constitutional Right, Any Error Was Harmless

Per Perry’s final prong, even assuming clear and obvious misconduct, a defendant
must still show “a reasonable possibility that the error affected the outcome of the trial.”
State v. Abdullah, 158 Idaho 386, 444, 348 P.3d 1, 59 (2015) (citing Perry, 150 Idaho at
226, 245 P.3d at 978). “The burden is on the defendant to prove ‘there is a reasonable
possibility that the error affected the outcome of the trial.’” Abdullah, 158 Idaho at 416,
348 P.3d at 31 (quoting Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978).
“Prosecutorial misconduct during closing arguments will constitute fundamental
error only if the comments were so egregious or inflammatory that any consequent
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prejudice could not have been remedied by a ruling from the trial court informing the jury
that the comments should be disregarded.” State v. Lankford, 162 Idaho 477, ___, 399
P.3d 804, 824 (2017) (quoting State v. Parker, 157 Idaho 132, 146, 334 P.3d 806, 820
(2014)). To determine prejudice, therefore, “[t]he relevant question is whether the
prosecutors’ comments ‘so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting
conviction a denial of due process.’” Lankford, 162 Idaho at ___, 399 P.3d at 824
(quoting Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986)).
Jones has failed to show fundamental error, because, even assuming the
prosecutor’s remarks were misconduct, the error would have been harmless. The jury
was instructed that lawyers’ arguments and statements “are not evidence,” and that what
lawyers “say in their opening statements, closing arguments and at other times is included
to help you interpret the evidence, but is not evidence.” (R., p. 130.) Moreover, Jones
was acquitted of one of the charges against him (R., p. 141), which is wholly inconsistent
with Jones’s theory that the purportedly “egregious and inflammatory” remarks
prejudiced the jury against him. (See Appellant’s brief, p. 12.)
Furthermore, Jones has not met his burden to show a reasonable possibility that
the error affected the trial. He does not cite any direct effects that the prosecutor’s
remarks had on the trial. (See generally, Appellant’s brief.)

Rather, quoting defense

counsel below, Jones argues the error could not have been harmless because this was a
“very close” and “hotly contested” case. (Appellant’s brief, p. 12 (quoting Tr. vol. I., p.
248, Ls. 12-17).)
But simply reciting trial counsel’s optimistic assessment of the evidence,
presented in argument at sentencing, does not make this a close case. To the contrary, the

16

state presented abundant evidence to support the conviction, including multiple
eyewitness testimony (Tr. vol. I, pp. 128-199), Jones’s admissions to crucial elements of
the crime (Tr. vol. II, p. 54, L. 12 – p. 55, L. 19; p. 84, L. 24 – p. 85, L. 2), and
corroborating photographs that tended to show Jones did in fact choke Umbaugh (see
-State’s Ex. 2; Tr. vol. I, p. 143, L. 19 – p. 144, L. 4; p. 145, L. 19 – p. 146, L. 11; p. 219,
L. 20 – p. 220, L. 5). Any appraisal that this was a “close” evidentiary case was therefore
appropriately dismantled by the district court at sentencing:
I will tell you this, Mr. Jones, it is ludicrous, ludicrous for you to get on
the witness stand and testify that you had no substantial contact with this
woman when she had the bruising that she had in this case. Makes no
sense to me whatsoever.
(Tr. vol. I, p. 250, Ls. 21-25 (emphasis added).)
Jones also cites trial counsel’s argument that “the recording of the phone call
between Mr. Jones and his mother supported, rather than contradicted, Mr. Jones’
testimony that he did not intend to place his hands on Ms. Umbaugh’s neck.”
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 12-13 (transcription citation omitted).) However, by zeroing in on
Jones’s redirect testimony, Jones misses the point of the exhibit: to impeach Jones’s
initial testimony that he never touched Umbaugh’s neck. In light of the shifting story,
whether the recording “supported” the most recent version is inconsequential. Because
Jones testified to two completely different things—and only abandoned Version One for
Version Two after the damaging audio surfaced—the recording ultimately only shows
Jones’s testimony, taken together, was unbelievable.
Jones similarly argues the photographs showed Umbaugh’s neck was “red, but
there are no visible finger or hand marks,” and, as such, there was “very limited physical
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evidence that Ms. Umbaugh sustained injuries consistent with attempted strangulation.”
(Appellant’s brief, p. 13.) This misses the forest for the trees, because evidence showing
a reddened, injured neck tends to confirm what Umbaugh testified to: that Jones choked
her. (See State’s Ex. 2; Tr. vol. I, p. 143, L. 19 – p. 144, L. 4; p. 145, L. 19 – p. 146, L.
11; p. 219, L. 20 – p. 220, L. 5.) Even if the photographs did not show finger marks, this
did not disprove Umbaugh’s testimony, given that she testified finger mark bruising only
developed “after time passed,” in the days after the officer’s picture was taken. (See Tr.
vol. I, p. 147, L. 15 – p. 148, L. 5; p. 160, L. 25 – p. 161, L. 3.) However, the
photographs—like the audio—completely undermined Jones’s initial testimony that he
never touched Umbaugh on the neck. To the extent the photographs are additional
evidence showing Jones choked Umbaugh, and therefore additional evidence impeaching
him, this was just more evidence supporting the victim’s testimony and the jury’s verdict.
Jones fails to show this was a close case, and fails to show any error was not
harmless. Even assuming the prosecutor’s remark was improper, Jones has failed to
show fundamental error on appeal.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the judgment of conviction.
DATED this 4th day of December, 2017.

/s/ Kale D. Gans_________
KALE D. GANS
Deputy Attorney General
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